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An Exegetical Note on Plutarch, Isis and Osiris 351E
*
 
 
abstract: In this article, I deal with a short but complex sentence at the end of the first chapter of 
Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris. Plutarch there says that “the happiness of even the eternal life, 
which God has obtained as his portion, consists in the fact that the things that come to be do 
not, through knowledge, fail in advance” (351E). This obscure phrase implies, so I argue, 
that Plutarch’s providential God has a knowledge of particular contingencies and that this 
knowledge indeed contributes to his eternal blessedness without affecting His essence. 
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At the beginning of his famous proem to Isis and Osiris, Plutarch underlines the great importance of 
our pursuit of the truth about the gods. This pursuit is even regarded as a longing for divinity (351E: 
θειότητος ὄρεξις1), for the very blessedness of the god does not consist in material wealth or power but 
in knowledge and intelligence (351D). After a brief allusion to Homer (Il. 13, 354-355), Plutarch 
concludes the chapter with the following idea
2
: 
 
οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς, ἣν ὁ θεὸς εἴληχεν, εὔδαιμον εἶναι τὸ τῇ γνώσει μὴ προαπολείπειν 
τὰ γιγνόμενα· τοῦ δὲ γιγνώσκειν τὰ ὄντα καὶ φρονεῖν ἀφαιρεθέντος, οὐ βίον ἀλλὰ χρόνον εἶναι 
τὴν ἀθανασίαν (351E). 
 
τό om. Laur. 80.5; προαπολείπειν Bernardakis; προαπολιπεῖν manuscripts; τὰ γιγνόμενα 
manuscripts; τὰ γινωσκόμενα Wyttenbach; τῶν γινομένων Reiske. 
 
This is a very important but also a particularly difficult sentence. The problem mainly concerns the 
precise meaning of the obscure phrase τὸ τῇ γνώσει μὴ προαπολείπειν τὰ γιγνόμενα, which has, as far as I 
know, as yet never been understood correctly. Basically three alternative interpretations have been 
proposed thus far. 
 
1) The first interpretation (Meunier, Hopfner, Cavalli) connects the happiness of the eternal life with 
its knowledge of everything that exists
3
. This interpretation has important advantages from a 
philosophical point of view, in that it enables to situate the god firmly on his own intelligible realm. 
And that is indeed what we could expect in Plutarch’s Platonic perspective. Elsewhere in Isis and 
Osiris, we read that Osiris is “far removed from the earth, undefiled, unpolluted and pure from any 
being that is subjected to decay and death” (382F) and that Zeus’ “mind and reason are of themselves 
                                                 
*
 I am much indebted to the two anonymous referees of the journal, who pointed to some difficulties of my 
argument in an earlier draft of this article and encouraged me to clarify my view. They should not be held 
responsible for remaining shortcomings. 
1
 An obvious allusion to the traditional end of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, which Plutarch fully endorsed; see on this esp. 
Becchi 1996, where much relevant material from both Plutarch and other Platonists is conveniently listed. A 
detailed analysis of the introduction to Isis and Osiris can be found in Roskam 2014. 
2
 I follow the most recent edition of the treatise, by Bernardakis - Ingenkamp 2009. 
3
 Meunier 1924, p. 22: “le bonheur de l’existence éternelle, qui est l’apanage de Dieu, consiste en ceci, à savoir 
que rien de tout ce qui est ne peut échapper à sa connaissance”; Hopfner 1941, p. 3: “Ich glaube nämlich, daß die 
Seeligkeit des ewigen Lebens, dessen Gott teilhaftig ward, nur darin besteht, daß es an Erkenntnis nicht hinter all 
dem zurückbleibt, was (wahrhaft) existiert”; Cavalli 1985, p. 57: “ancora nel fatto che la conoscenza divina 
possiede per sempre la realtà degli avvenimenti, consiste l’eccellenza di quella vita eterna che al dio appartiene”. 
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fixed amid the unseen and unperceived” (376C). The most important problem with this interpretation, 
however, which also distinguishes it from the others, is that it interprets τὰ γιγνόμενα as “everything 
that (really) exists” (“was (wahrhaft) existiert” [Hopfner] or “la realtà degli avvenimenti” [Cavalli]). 
Thus, it actually equates τὰ γιγνόμενα with the following τὰ ὄντα. Such a blurring of ontological levels 
is quite unlikely for a Platonist like Plutarch and moreover, the interpretation thus seems to ignore the 
connection between the two parts of the sentence: the particle δέ (instead of γάρ) in fact shows that the 
second part is not meant as a further explanation but rather introduces something new. Opsomer 
ventured an interesting attempt to both have the cake of this interpretation and eat it, that is, to 
carefully maintain the distinction between the levels of τὰ γιγνόμενα and τὰ ὄντα while at the same time 
keeping God in the intelligible realm. He argues that God’s knowledge concerns first of all intelligible 
being, and then also the world to the extent that the latter participates in intelligibility
4
. This is a clever 
suggestion that succeeds in safeguarding Plutarch’s philosophical consistency, but it is difficult of 
course to read all this in the simple concept of τὰ γιγνόμενα. 
 
2) The second alternative (Babbitt, Froidefond) connects the happiness of the eternal life with God’s 
prescience of events
5
. This interpretation first of all raises some grammatical problems, notably 
concerning the dative τῇ γνώσει. Among the translations listed in note 5, those of Babbitt, Cilento, 
Valgiglio, Pordomingo Pardo and García Valdés require a genitive (which is the usual complement of 
προαπολείπειν; cf. LSJ ad loc.), that of Griffiths an accusative (as the subject of προαπολείπειν). 
Furthermore, the precise meaning of the verb προαπολείπειν (left untranslated by Froidefond) is not 
“escape” but “leave before” or “fail before”. In this light, all these translations more or less ignore the 
precise semantic value of the verb προαπολείπειν and its combination in this passage with a dative 
instead of a genitive. An obvious advantage of this interpretation, as compared to the first alternative, 
is that it does at least justice to the philosophical sense of τὰ γιγνόμενα, yet it also causes a new 
philosophical problem. God’s absolute prescience of events most likely implies the loss of human free 
will
6
, and this is utterly unacceptable for Plutarch. 
                                                 
4
 Opsomer 1997, p. 350: “on peut, me semble-t-il, avancer l’hypothèse que la science divine se rapporte d’abord 
à l’être intelligible, et secondairement au monde dans la mesure où celui-ci participe à l’intelligibilité” (his 
italics). 
5
 Babbitt 1936, p. 9: “a source of happiness in the eternal life, which is the lot of God, is that events which come 
to pass do not escape His prescience”; Froidefond 1988, p. 178: “la béatitude de la vie éternelle, privilège de la 
divinité, consiste dans la prescience de ce qui va être”. We may also compare the following translations, which 
are better in that they are more neutral, but which involve basically the same grammatical problems as those of 
Babbitt and Froidefond: Cilento 1962, p. 9: “l’essenza della beatitudine, nella vita eterna che Dio ebbe in sorte, 
consiste nel fatto che gli avvenimenti non possono sfuggire alla sua conoscenza”; Griffiths 1970, p. 119: “the 
happiness which marks even the eternal life which God enjoys consists in the fact that his knowledge does not 
lag behind events”; Valgiglio 1988, p. 15: “La sua felicità consiste [...] nel fatto che gli avvenimenti non possono 
sfuggire alla sua conoscenza”; Pordomingo Pardo 1995, p. 62: “la dicha de la vida eterna, que es la suerte de la 
divinidad, radica en que los acontecimientos no escapan a du conocimiento”; García Valdés 1995, p. 57: “la 
felicidad de la vida eterna, que es lote del dios, consiste en que los acontecimientos no escapan a su 
conocimiento”. 
6
 Cf. Opsomer 1997, p. 250. 
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3) The third interpretation (Bernard) is, to my mind, the best one: God’s happiness lies in the fact that 
he, in his knowledge, does not in advance leave behind the things that come to be
7
. This alternative 
differs from the first interpretation in that it correctly interprets τὰ γιγνόμενα as things that come to be 
(rather than things that really are), and improves on the second interpretation by avoiding the notion of 
prescience and by staying quite close to the Greek text. Yet two minor problems may be raised. First, 
the dative τῇ γνώσει (“in der Erkenntnis”) should in all likelihood rather be understood as causal, as 
appears from a perfect parallel in Against the Stoics on common conceptions
8
. Second, Bernard 
assumes a transitive use of προαπολείπειν (“vorher hinter sich läßt”), whereas in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, Plutarch uses the verb in an intransitive way
9
. As a matter of fact, there are only two 
instances in the entire Corpus Plutarcheum where προαπολείπειν is apparently used transitively. Both 
occur in the same section of On moral virtue and since neither of them is unproblematic
10
, it is safe to 
say that an intransitive sense would be more in line with the Plutarchan style. In this respect, the 
translations grouped together under the second alternative prove superior. 
Apart from these two minor quibbles, Bernard’s overall interpretation of the meaning of this 
passage raises some further questions. He understands the phrase against the background of an 
opposition between divine and human knowledge. Human beings, on the one hand, need to go from τὰ 
γιγνόμενα to τὰ ὄντα in order to reach true knowledge. God, on the other hand, knows being directly 
and thus need not follow such a course
11
. This general explanation makes perfect sense from a Platonic 
perspective, but it does not do away with all interpretative difficulties. For this particular passage 
simply does not deal with a contrast between human and divine knowledge, and even in the broader 
context Plutarch never discusses the importance of τὰ γιγνόμενα for human knowledge. The sentence 
                                                 
7
 Bernard 1990, p. 206: “daß <Gott> in der Erkenntnis das Werdende nicht vorher hinter sich läßt”. 
8
 De comm. not. 1078F: ἀνίσων γὰρ νοουμένων, τὸ μὲν προαπολείπεται τοῖς ἐσχάτοις μέρεσι τὸ δὲ παραλλάττει καὶ 
περίεστι, which is translated by Cherniss (LCL) as “when things are conceived as unequal, it is by the ultimate 
parts that the one leaves off before the other and the other passes it by and is in excess of it”. 
9
 De ad. et am. 74E; De sera num. 558C; An seni 787B, 789D and 797D; De facie 937A; De comm. not. 1078F 
and 1080A. 
10
 The phrase προενδίδωσιν ἡ ὁρμὴ καὶ προαπολείπει τὸ καλόν in De virt. mor. 444C is ambivalent and may be 
understood either way. Most interpretations assume a transitive use here (e.g. Babbitt [LCL] ad loc.: “the 
impulsion yields too soon and prematurely forsakes the good; similarly Babut 1969, p. 100: “l’impulsion se 
relâche prématurément et reste en deçà du bien” and Becchi 1990, p. 91: “l’impulso si rilassa e cede prima di 
raggiungere il bene”), but an intransitive interpretation is perfectly possible as well: “the impulsion yields too 
soon and the good prematurely takes its leave”. The second occurrence is less ambivalent: ὑπερβάλλοντες τὸ 
μέτριον ἢ προαπολείποντες (444B). I grant that the most natural interpretation here would probably assume that τὸ 
μέτριον is the object of both verbs, although I am not sure whether this is the only possible interpretation, or even 
the correct one. To my mind, it cannot be excluded that even here, the verb is used intransitively, as everywhere 
else in Plutarch’s works, but even apart from this, a note of caution is in place here, since a couple of 
manuscripts appear to read ἀπολείποντες instead of προαπολείποντες. 
11
 Bernard 1990, p. 206: “Der Mensch muß gemäß platonischer Auffassung die Stufe der Erkenntnis des 
Werdenden erst übersteigen, um zur Erkenntnis des Seienden zu gelangen. Gott hingegen hat in seiner 
Erkenntnis keinen solchen Weg zurückzulegen, da er das Seiende unmittelbar erkennt. In diesem Sinne ist nur 
Gott zu echter Erkenntnis fähig, wie Plutarch vorher gesagt hat”. 
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rather concerns divine eternal happiness and the significance of a particular kind of knowledge for this 
happiness. 
 
It is time now to turn to the sentence as a whole. I first propose a literal translation, which keep as 
close to the Greek as possible and tries to do justice to the dative τῇ γνώσει, to the intransitive use of 
προαπολείπειν, to the significance of the particle δέ and to the Platonic distinction between τὰ γιγνόμενα 
and τὰ ὄντα: 
 
In my opinion, the happiness of even the eternal life, which God has obtained as his 
portion, consists in the fact that the things that come to be do not, through knowledge, fail 
in advance. But if one takes away knowledge of what exists and thinking, immortality 
would not be life but a mere passage of time. 
 
If this literal translation of the passage indeed succeeds in solving the above mentioned problems, it is 
bought at a high cost. I voluntarily agree that it is quite abstruse and is unlikely to be readily 
understood. When I still stick to it for the time being, it is because I first want to keep very close to the 
Greek text, which is far from useless in view of all the interpretative problems mentioned above. 
Moreover, it may help to see how tantalisingly obscure Plutarch’s own phrasing actually is. We may 
presume that Clea, the dedicatee of the treatise, or any other ancient reader, may have paused here for 
a moment to ponder on the precise meaning of the sentence. 
It is clear, then, that this literal translation is in need of some further comment, unless we would fall 
into the trap of explaining obscurum per obscurius. Let us thus try to further clarify the sense of this 
complex argument. As argued above, the connective particle δέ links two different moves in the 
argument. The second step is the clearest one: thanks to God’s knowledge of what really is (τὰ ὄντα), 
his immortality surpasses the mere lapse of time and becomes true living. This is the intelligible level. 
God is more than simply τὸ ἄφθαρτον: he is a conscious living being who knows what is. But if we turn 
to God’s happiness, yet another component comes into play, and this is introduced in the tantalising 
phrase τὸ τῇ γνώσει μὴ προαπολείπειν τὰ γιγνόμενα. It is through his knowledge (causal dative) that God 
does not leave τὰ γιγνόμενα beforehand, or intransitively, that these γιγνόμενα do not fail in advance. To 
my mind the prefix προ- is an important key for a correct understanding of what this precisely means12. 
It obviously denotes that something happens “before” something else. But what happens before what? 
From a general Platonic point of view, we could expect that the intelligible realm a priori excludes 
any attention to the phenomena. That would mean that these phenomena are left behind “before” one 
turns to the intelligible world, or, in other terms, that the γιγνόμενα fail “before” one reaches the level 
of knowledge (γνῶσις). What we get in this passage is exactly the opposite. Plutarch is thinking of a 
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 One of the referees perceptibly warns against overinterpreting the prefix προ-, as it may, after all, only reflect a 
tendency that we often find in Plutarch, that is, the fondness for an accumulation of prefixes. This caveat makes 
sense indeed, yet to my mind, we should prefer, if possible, an interpretation that can do justice to the full 
(philosophical) relevance of the prefix προ-. 
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kind of knowledge through which these γιγνόμενα are not a priori left behind. God’s knowledge is 
such that it is not exclusively concerned with the intelligible but also shows a certain openness for 
concrete events. This is basically in line with a passage from On the decline of oracles, where Plutarch 
argues that Zeus is not merely focusing on himself alone
13
. 
But if this holds true, we risk to fall from Scylla into Charybdis. For we indeed immediately touch 
upon another philosophical conundrum that was already mentioned above. Is human freedom not 
directly menaced by this divine knowledge of τὰ γιγνόμενα? Not necessarily. Plutarch nowhere says 
that he is thinking of prescience. The opposite is rather true: the fact that τὰ γιγνόμενα are not a priori 
excluded, may well suggest that God only comes to know them at the very moment that they come to 
be. This implies a quite dynamic conception of God. His knowledge has nothing static, is not limited 
to real being, to what a Platonist would call ὄντως ὄν, but takes into account contingent events too. 
Now Plutarch does not go so far as to conclude that this knowledge of particular contingencies also 
affects God’s essence14, yet he does argue in this striking passage that it is at least partly constitutive 
of his eternal blessedness, and even that is quite a radical and remarkable conclusion for a Platonist. I 
would regard this position as the crystalization of the ultimate consequence of Plutarch’s providential 
thinking of God. For Plutarch’s God is a lover of mankind (φιλάνθρωπος)15 who derives pleasure from 
the mere act of being gracious and doing good (Friends and Flatterers 63F). To the extent, then, that 
God’s providence contributes to his happiness and that his knowledge of τὰ γιγνόμενα is a necesary 
condition for his providential working
16
, we may indeed conclude that this knowledge directly 
contributes to God’s eternal blessedness. 
If all this is true, it is clear that this passage at the outset of Isis and Osiris raises problems that have 
to do with the very core of Plutarch’s philosophical and theological convictions. It also illustrates 
important and recurrent characteristics of Plutarch’s thinking about God. We saw that he here develops 
a particularly high-minded and dynamic conception of God that can be reconciled with his 
fundamental outlook as a Platonist philosopher. And we may finally add that the passage also allows 
us a glimpse into the heart of Plutarch, the priest of Apollo. After all, if there was one place on earth 
where it became tangibly clear what it meant that τὰ γιγνόμενα need not προαπολείπειν because of God’s 
knowledge, it was certainly Delphi. 
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